



It is said in France that no one can be in business for five
hours without violating the law.
In the United States, no business of even moderate size can
operate for twenty minutes without being faced with, if not the
occasion for antitrust sin, at least the suspicion of having sinned.
So broadly have the courts conceived their regulatory role, and
so various are the forms of business conduct regulated in the name
of antitrust, that virtually no business having suppliers, customers
or competitors can count itself safe from the prying eyes of govern-
mental investigators or treble damage suitors. The enormous po-
tency of antitrust as a business regulator in our society and the
haphazard manner of its invocation from case to case have, in the
eyes of many business managers, raised antitrust litigation to the
status of a natural calamity, like a flood or fire, or a major economic
disaster, like a strike, calling for belt-tightening and the mobiliza-
tion of defensive reserves to meet a time of loss, harassment and trial.
The antitrust bar lives close to the antitrust calamity. Like seis-
mologists, its members are fascinated by antitrust eruptions and
their consequences. At frequent intervals in Ohio, as elsewhere
throughout the country, the members meet to compare notes on
their observations. The papers in this issue of the OHio STATE LAW
JouRNAL were originally presented at such a meeting, on the oc-
casion of the Ohio State Bar Association's 87th Annual Meeting
at Dayton in May, 1967. For the most part they have been sub-
stantially rewritten for publication.
As befits a subject so various as antitrust, the papers cover a
wide range.
For his contribution, former Federal Trade Commissioner John
R. Reilly examines the phenomenon of the conglomerate merger.
In the last several years, conglomerates have become fashionable
vehicles for corporate expansion, partly no doubt because of their
supposed immunity, or at least resistance, to antitrust attack. There
is no question that the enforcement agencies have had their diffi-
culties establishing new tests of illegality. But, as Mr. Reilly points
out, the elimination of potential competition, the gaining of de-
cisive competitive advantages, the raising of barriers to market en-
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try, and the creation of anticompetitive reciprocity opportunities
have all furnished means for attacking what the Commission re-
gards as a major cause of industrial concentration today.
Richard Pogue's article analyzes the new uncertainties injected
into the law of territorial and customer restraints by United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). He traces the ups
and downs of vertical resale restrictions at the hands of the Supreme
Court in ten leading cases, from the ringing prohibition of price
maintenance in Dr. Miles to the technical permissiveness of Colgate
and, more recently, from the self-deprecating willingness of the
Court to listen to justifications for territorial and customer resale
restrictions in White Motor to the explicit ban on them in Schwinn.
In the light of that history, he catalogues the restrictions as to price,
territory and customer which manufacturers may impose with re-
spect to the distribution of their products, and appraises the vary-
ing degrees of risk attached to each.
Mr. Pogue is troubled by the alternating per se rigidity and
ad hoc flexibility suggested by Schwinn. Except in cases where "title
has passed" (a magic phrase which, according to Schwinn, auto-
matically invokes the ancient shibboleth against "restraints on alien-
ation"), the seedlings of small business are entitled to protect them-
selves by sundry restrictive props and fences which are denied the
mighty oaks of the forest. But, asks Mr. Pogue, how does one tell
a middle-aged seedling from a young oak? And how, one may also
ask, is a pampered "newcomer" or small business to be deprived of
its restrictive prerogatives without acute withdrawal symptoms when
it has grown to antitrust maturity? The only certainty, concludes
Mr. Pogue, is continued uncertainty (for which we may read "still
more litigation about distribution practices").
John McClatchey reviews in his article several current areas
of difficulty under the Robinson-Patman Act. When does a whole-
saler's customer become an "indirect customer" of the manufactur-
er? When does the concept "like grade and quality" yield to physical
differences in products? What competitive pricing practices, not
themselves predatory, will support a rival seller's claim for dam.
ages? To what extent can a seller give price recognition to valuable
distribution functions performed by some jobbers but not by others?
Mr. McClatchey concludes with a brief discussion of the "meeting
competition" defense and problems associated with promotional
allowances.
Carl Steinhouse, Chief of the Great Lakes Field Office of the
Antitrust Division, has furnished a straight-forward explanation of
the government antitrust investigation. How to react to such an
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investigation is the subject of the panel discussion among four pri-
vate practitioners - Messrs. Ford, Monroe, Bates and Unger - with
comments by Chief Steinhouse on the propriety and effectiveness
of the suggested approach.
These papers are not caviar for the general. The immediacy of
antitrust - its terrible effectiveness as a business challenge - its
virtual irresistibility in the hands of a skillful and determined prac-
titioner - have removed it from the realm of the rich and recherche.
For if the operations of any business of moderate size are susceptible
to antitrust attack, the lawyers who represent such businesses have
fools for clients who do not insist on adequate antitrust repre-
sentation.
At the same time, it is imperative that there be a more general
understanding of the truly calamitous nature of the antitrust pro-
ceeding, and that, as in the case of every natural calamity, attempts
be made to ameliorate at least the more distressing inequities which
it can cause.
It is no secret, for example, that the government antitrust agen-
cies are inherently "political" vehicles, interested no doubt in the
abstractions of fair competition, motivated in part by the purest of
professional desires to build trust-busting reputations, but usually
set in motion by politicians, political pressures, and political needs.
When the initiation of an investigation turns on political sponsor-
ship, who can predict where the onslaught will fall? And what as-
surance can there be that the heavy hand of antitrust will fall with
equal weight on the equally guilty (or innocent) everywhere?
Besides the government, and lying in wait at every turn of the
business screw, are the self-interested: the suppliers, customers and
competitors who more and more accept as established practice the
extension of business relationships into antitrust litigation. No
longer is it infra dig for substantial and reputable corporations to
bring treble damage and injunction suits claiming competitive in-
juries against other substantial and reputable corporations. And if
the substantial and reputable are antitrust plaintiffs, one need not
wonder that the nuisance suitors, the business failures, and the ag-
gressive newcomers swarm about them in the courthouse, buzzing
with phantasmagorical allegations of conspiracy, discrimination,
monopoly, and the like.
It is the nature of antitrust, aided no doubt by badly drafted
statutes, overlapping governmental authorities, busy courts, and the
heady prospect of recovering treble damages and attorneys' fees, that
makes antitrust litigation so attractive an enterprise for the nimble-
witted, the hard-headed, and the long-winded. How noble and awe-
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some the appointed task: to protect the weak from the strong, re-
move unreasonable clogs on commerce, spur competition, prevent
discrimination, preserve a free enterprise economyl But how crude
the means and how inequitable the resultsl
Discovery is the principal weapon of antitrust battle. The bur-
den of unrestrained inquisition by interrogatory, deposition, and
demands for documentary production - involving in some cases
hundreds of witnesses, thousands of files, and decades of time past
- is simply inconceivable to lawyers unfamiliar with the wonder-
land of antitrust. The usual litany of conclusory antitrust charges
has come to be a hunting license for the antitrust plaintiff. With
nothing more in hand, he is free to stalk the defendants' officers,
employees and records searching for evidentiary tidbits relating,
not to one or several isolated events, but to a limitless course of
business conduct, until he runs out of time and money.
There is an obvious need for close judicial supervision and
control over antitrust discovery. The antitrust plaintiff is only too
ready to take the whole sinful antitrust world for his hunting pre-
serve. The court must work from the outset towards focusing the
issues, and must keep discovery pointed toward those issues.
Unfortunately, even the routine housekeeping requirements
of antitrust litigation tend to exasperate busy courts preoccupied
with heavy dockets and other demands on their time and attention.
The sheer bulk of the record and the complexity and imprecision
of the issues combine and conspire to dissuade the most conscientious
judges from the intellectual and physical tasks of mastering the ac-
tion and keeping it cut down to size.
The same factors tend to cause substitution of a search for
evidentiary nuggets in place of definitions of markets and analyses
of market effects. Courts and juries unaccustomed to antitrust find
its legal-economic concepts difficult to grasp, and they are put off
by the impenetrable language of the experts. The result is an un-
warranted emphasis on minutiae. The litigation ignores what ac-
tually happened in the marketplace and turns instead on an un-
fortunately worded letter, a slip of the tongue on deposition, or
some other snare. In search of such golden pebbles, aggressive anti.
trust suitors will sieve vast moraines of gravel.
It is easy to see why the discovery weapon, in antitrust cases,
is fearsome and frequently determinative. Few defendants are in a
position to make antitrust litigation their principal business activity.
Few are anxious to speculate on the highly unscientific results of
trial. And fewer still are prepared to face with equanimity the pen.
alties incident to an adverse verdict and judgment, no matter how
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upright their business character and conduct.
There is no easy dichotomy between "good" and "bad" anti-
trust suits to guide the courts. All are entitled to be tried. What
the courts can do - and must do if the rising tide of treble damage
antitrust litigation is not to pollute the ordinary channels of com-
merce and inundate the federal judicial system - is to accept re-
sponsibility at the outset for precise clarification of issues and ener-
getic direction of discovery towards those issues. Unrestrained dis-
covery and unsupervised pre-trial maneuvering can damage irrepa-
rably both the rights of the parties and the role of antitrust as a
business regulator. The courts should not wait until those evils
have occurred to take action but should move promptly, in the spirit
of the Clayton Act, to cut them off in their incipiency.
As a first step in that direction, there must be greater familiar-
ity by bench and bar alike with the actual workings and meaning
of antitrust. The arcane mysteries, and the conceptual or semantic
difficulties, that in so many cases have caused judicious men to
blanch and honest minds to boggle, must be shown to be a legal
variant of the emperor's clothes.
These papers are offered as part of the continuing program of
the Antitrust Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association to
extend ever more widely an educated appreciation of antitrust in
action.
1968]
